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The net present value of costs and benefits from a pay-as-you-go social security system are 
negative for young people and positive for the elderly. If people all vote their financial self-
interest, there will be a pivotal age such that those who are younger favor smaller social 
security benefits and those who are older will favor larger benefits. For persons of each age 
and sex, we estimate the expected present value gained or lost from a small permanent 
increase in the amount of benefits, where the cost of these benefits is divided equally among 
the population of working age. Assuming that everyone votes his or her long run financial 
self-interest, and calculating the number of voters in the population of each age and sex, we 
can determine whether there is majority support for an increase or a decrease in social security 
benefits. We use statistics on the age distribution and mortality rates for the United States to 
explore the sensitivity of political support for social security to alternative assumptions about 
the discount rate, excess burden in taxation, voter participation rates, and birth, death, and 
migration rates. We find that a once-and-for-all decrease in benefits would be defeated by a 
majority of selfish voters under a wide range of parameters. We also study the predicted 
majority outcomes of votes on changing the retirement age. 




Theodore C. Bergstrom 
Economics Department 
University of California Santa Barbara 
Santa Barbara, CA 93106 
USA 
tedb@econ.ucsb.edu 
John L. Hartman 
Economics Department 
University of California Santa Barbara 




  1 Introduction
A permanent increase in social security beneﬁts funded by taxes collected
from working people will be ﬁnancially beneﬁcial to those suﬃciently near
retirement and harmful to those who are far from retirement. This paper
investigates the political support for pay-as-you-go retirement plans in the
United States, on the assumption that persons of each age vote in their
selﬁsh ﬁnancial interest. For selﬁsh voters, there will be a pivotal age such
that those who are older favor increased beneﬁts and those who are younger
favor decreased beneﬁts. We estimate the expected present value of ben-
eﬁts and costs to a U.S. citizen of each age and sex from a permanent $1
annual increase in retirement beneﬁts, assuming that in every year, the cost
of these beneﬁts will be divided equally among the population of working
age. We used U.S. census data on population by age, along with age-speciﬁc
birth and death rates in an Excel spreadsheet to calculate the present value,
positive or negative, of a tax-supported permanent increase in retirement
beneﬁts to a person of each age and sex. To make these calculations we
need projections of the population by age and sex for the relevant future
time. These projections are based on the current age distribution, current
birth rates and a range of conjectures about future immigration rates. The
Excel format allows us to vary parameters so that we can explore the sen-
sitivity of political support for social security to alternative assumptions
about the discount rate, the amount of excess burden in taxation, voter
participation rates, changes in projected mortality and birth rates, among
other parameters.
Social security beneﬁts can be changed by altering the level of payments,
but also by changing the age at which workers retire and become eligible
1for payments. Those who are older than the current retirement age have a
strong ﬁnancial interest in maintaining or increasing current beneﬁt levels,
but have no direct ﬁnancial interest in a change in retirement age that does
not aﬀect their own retirement status. We study the likely outcome of ma-
jority voting by selﬁsh individuals on a permanent change in the retirement
age. Unlike preferences over the size of beneﬁts, preferences over retirement
age are not monotonic with age. For example, a proposal to increase the
retirement age by one year will be favored by those who are much younger
than retirement age and opposed by those who are close to retirement age,
but those who are currently older than either of the alternatives considered
will be indiﬀerent about the change.
2 Related Literature
Browning [3] pointed out that if a single once-and-for-all election were held
to determine the levels of pensions, then a coalition of persons of median age
and higher would select an ineﬃcient pension plan that beneﬁts the current
elderly at the expense of all future generations. If the issue of pension
levels is frequently revisited by voters, the matter is less straightforward. In
an economy inhabited by a sequence of overlapping generations of ﬁnitely-
lived agents, when will expectations of current populations be maintained
by voters of succeeding generations? Sjoblom [9] presents a model in which
social security provides the only source of saving and where an eﬃcient
intertemporal transfer scheme can be maintained as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in a game played between generations. Casamatta, Cremer, and
Pestieau [4] consider a voting model in which workers diﬀer both by age and
by wage rate. There are two age groups, the workers and the retired, and a
2constant rate of growth of population. Pay-as-you-go pensions redistribute
income not only between generations but also between skill groups. Cooley
and Soares [5] and Boldrin and Rustichini [2] study the interaction between
capital accumulation and social security in general equilibrium models of
a closed economy with constant population growth rates where levels of
social security payments are determined periodically by majority voting.
Razin, Sadka, and Swagel [6] and Razin and Sadka [7] examine the problems
that arise in the social security systems in countries with increasing life
expectancy and falling birth rates.
Sinn and Uebelmesser [8] investigate the age distribution of net present
values of the Germany social security system. They draw two curves on a
graph with time on the horizontal axis. One curve shows the median age
of voters in each year from 2000 until 2030. The second curve shows the
“indiﬀerence age” for each year. This is the pivotal age such that older
voters gain and younger voters lose from an increase in beneﬁts. A majority
of voters will favor a decrease or an increase in beneﬁts depending on whether
the median age curve lies below or above the indiﬀerence age curve. With
Germany’s aging population, both curves slope upwards, but the median
age curve is more steeply sloping. From the years 2000-2015, the median
age curve lies below the indiﬀerence age curve, but for the years beyond
2015, the indiﬀerence age is higher. This suggests that currently, a majority
of selﬁsh voters who understood the beneﬁts and costs will favor reductions
of beneﬁts, but after 2015, a majority will favor increases. Hence the paper
is titled “Pensions and the path to gerontocracy in Germany.”
Uebelmesser [10] extends the methods of the earlier Sinn-Uebelmesser
study to France and Italy. She ﬁnds that in Italy until 2006 and in France
until 2014, the population will be quite evenly divided between voters who
3would favor a permanent decrease and those who would favor a permanent
increase in pay-as-you-go pensions. After 2006 in Italy and 2014 in France,
a majority would favor increases.
Bohn [1] investigated the likely political sustainability of the U.S. social
security and medicare systems. He poses the question “Is social security
likely to maintain support as the population ages?” He estimated the net
present value of a pay-as-you-go pension system to voters of each age, given
the likely age distribution of the population over the next 30-50 years. Bohn
concluded that the net present value of this system is likely to be positive
for the majority of U.S. voters for the foreseeable future.
3 A Simpliﬁed Model of Social Security
We consider the following simpliﬁed pay-as-you-go social security plan. There
is a predetermined retirement age S such that on reaching age S, people
leave the work force and receive a constant social security payment for the
remainder of their lives. All persons whose ages are between 18 years and
the retirement age are assumed to work and to pay taxes to support the
social security beneﬁts of retirees. In each year, the total cost of social se-
curity payments is divided equally among all workers, who pay their share
of this cost in the form of a head tax.
Let us consider a proposal to permanently increase social security ben-
eﬁts for each retiree by $1 per year starting in the current period. In every
year, the current cost of this program will be paid for by taxation of the
current labor force. For people currently in the labor force, this increase
oﬀers the beneﬁts of greater anticipated payments when they retire but also
imposes a cost in the form of higher taxes in every year until they retire. For
4selﬁsh retired persons, the increase is an unambiguous beneﬁt, since they
receive additional beneﬁts and pay no costs.
A worker’s expected present value of beneﬁts from social security pay-
ments must be discounted by the appropriate time rate of discount and also
by the probability that he or she will be alive to receive them. Let r be
the rate at which an individual discounts future beneﬁts and costs, and let
Lt(a,x) be the probability that someone who is of age a at time t will still
be alive at age x. (To simplify calculations, we assume that nobody lives be-
yond age 100.) At time t, for a working person whose current age is a < S,
the expected present value of the beneﬁts resulting from a $1 increase in




Lt(a,S + j)(1 + r)−(S+j−a) (1)
At any time τ the tax cost to each current worker of increasing beneﬁts
for all retired persons by $1 is the “dependency ratio” D(τ) where D(τ) is
the ratio of the number of retired persons to the number of workers in year
τ. For a working person of age a, the expected present value of a permanent




Lt(a,a + j)D(t + j)(1 + r)−j (2)
We use gender-speciﬁc survival rates to construct separate estimates of
expected present values of beneﬁts and costs for men and for women at
each age between 18 and the retirement age. A worker of a given age and
sex is assumed to be in support of increased social security beneﬁts if for
that person, B(a) > C(a) and will otherwise oppose increased beneﬁts. All
persons older than retirement age are assumed to support increased beneﬁts.
54 Voting on Beneﬁt Levels
4.1 Self-interested Voting by the 2001 Population
Assuming a discount rate of 5% and that the retirement age is 66 years
(the current US retirement age for persons born between 1943 and 1954) we
calculated the expected net present value B(a)−C(a) by age and sex. The
graph of these present values is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Net Present Values by Age and Gender
 
 

































The pivotal age at which voters begin to favor increased social security
is 42 for men and 40 for women. A once-and-for-all small increase in pay-
6as-you-go beneﬁts would be of positive net present value for about 55% of
the population older than age 18. But the proportion of voters who gain
from such an increase is larger. In the United States, old people are much
more likely to vote than the young. Taking account of age-speciﬁc voting
rates, an increase in the size of beneﬁts would result in a higher expected
net present value for about 66% of actual voters.1
4.2 Excess Burden and Uncertainty About Beneﬁts
If indeed 65% of voters would gain from an increase in pay-as-you-go social
security beneﬁts, we must wonder why beneﬁts have not been increased be-
yond current levels. Perhaps this is evidence that voters are not so selﬁsh
as we have assumed. Parents who care about the welfare of their children
should take into account the fact that their gains from increased social se-
curity beneﬁts will be paid for, at least in part, by their own children.
Even voters who are entirely selﬁsh may believe that an increase in cur-
rent social security beneﬁts would result in smaller expected gains and larger
costs than those reﬂected in our calculations. Middle-aged voters may think
it quite likely that social security increases approved today will not be sus-
tained until their own generation reaches retirement age.
Voters may also believe that taxation that pays for social security ben-
eﬁts distorts private incentives in such a way that the total cost of raising
funds by taxes exceeds the amount of revenue raised. This perception cor-
responds to the economic theory of excess burden of taxation.
We can make some simple calculations that quantify the notions of un-
certain beneﬁts and excess burden. Suppose that a voter believes that the
1In the Appendix, we show how this percentage responds to alternative assumptions
about parameter values.
7probability is π that a small increase in social security instituted today will
persist until their own retirement. Suppose, further, that the degree of ex-
cess burden is such that for every dollar of tax revenue collected, the cost to
taxpayers is 1+b dollars. Then expected returns from an increase in beneﬁts
would be reduced by a factor of π and expected costs would be increased
by a factor of 1 + b. A selﬁsh voter of age a would favor an increase in
beneﬁts only if the ratio C(a)/B(a) < π/(1 + b), where C(a) and B(a) are
age speciﬁc expected costs and beneﬁts as calculated in the previous section.
We use our spreadsheet model to ﬁnd a ratio π/(1+b) such that for exactly
half of the voting population, C(a)/B(a) < π/(1 + b). This proportion is
π/(1 + b) = .6. This ratio corresponds, for example, to a case where con-
ﬁdence in the durability of an increase in beneﬁts is 75% and the cost to
taxpayers of raising $1 in revenue is $1.25.
4.3 Self-interested Voting by Future Populations
In previous sections, we examined the net beneﬁts of once-and-for-all marginal
increments in pay-as-you-go social security to the current voting population.
But how reasonable is it for voters to believe that an increment in today’s
beneﬁts will be sustained until their own retirements? One way to address
this question is to estimate the outcomes in future elections of proposals to
change the amount of social security beneﬁts.
As Figure 2 shows, the baby boom of the 1950’s and the subsequent
decline in the birth rate will result in a large increase in the proportion of
retirees in the population over the next twenty to thirty years. In 2001,
there were about 5.3 people of working age for every person aged 66 or
higher. This number will not change much by 2010. By 2020, it will fall to
8about 4.15 and by 2030 to about 3.2. On this account, the cost of the social
security system to workers will be about 29% higher in 2020 and 68% higher
in 2030 than current costs.
Figure 2: U.S. Age Distribution
 
 

























































As a result, the fraction of workers who favor increased social security
beneﬁts will decline. But there is a countervailing force. The population will
include a larger portion of retirees and workers who are close to retirement
and for whom an increase in beneﬁts represents a net gain in present value.
Our calculations suggest that the net eﬀect of these two forces will be a
small decline in the fraction of voters whose self-interest favors increased
beneﬁts. With baseline assumptions and no excess burden, this fraction
remains at roughly 65% in 2010 and falls to 63.3% by 2020 and 61.9% by
2030. These calculations suggest that, holding the retirement age constant,
9political support for maintaining the size of beneﬁts will be little changed
over the next 30 years, with a slight decrease in support.
5 Voting on Retirement Age
The scope of a retirement beneﬁt program depends not only on the size
of beneﬁts, but on the age of retirement. Suppose that with beneﬁts levels
ﬁxed, there is voting on the age at which retirement beneﬁts begin. Workers
who are close to retirement will gain from a reduction in the retirement age,
while young workers will gain from an increase in the retirement age. But
in contrast to the case of voting on beneﬁt levels, voters who are older than
either of the proposed retirement ages have no direct economic stake in the
outcome.
Voting on retirement age introduces one more complication not seen in
the case of beneﬁt levels. Selﬁsh voters do not in general have single-peaked
preferences over retirement age. For example, in the context of our model,
if the current retirement age is 66, a selﬁsh 35-year old voter would oppose
a reduction in the retirement age from 66 to 65 years, but would favor a
reduction in the retirement age from 66 to 36 years.
5.1 Once-and-for-all changes in retirement age
Because voters’ preferences are not single-peaked with respect to retirement
age, there is the possibility of voting cycles and it may turn out that every
possible retirement age can be defeated in majority voting by some other
age. However, we ﬁnd empirically that if voting is restricted to choices about
“small changes” in the retirement age, then for the U.S. population, over
the parameter values that we have observed, there is always at least one
10retirement age that can not be defeated either by a one year increase or a
one year decrease.
In our calculations, we assume that retired voters whose retirement sta-
tus will not be aﬀected by the outcome will split their votes equally between
these options. For the U.S. population in 2001, with our baseline assump-
tions about parameter values and assuming that there is no excess burden in
taxation, the unique age that cannot be defeated in majority vote by either
a one year increase or a one year decrease is 59.
If we assume that taxation to pay for social security imposes a dead-
weight loss of 20%, then for the 2001 population, the stable age under ma-
jority voting would be 66. With a 20% excess burden, voting by the 2010
population results in a stable retirement age of 70, and voting by the 2020
population would push the retirement age to 99 years.
Over the next thirty years, as the ratio of the retired to the working
population grows and the cost of maintaining a given level of beneﬁts rises,
a growing proportion of workers will ﬁnd that their self-interest favors a once-
and-for-all increase in the retirement age. Since there is no countervailing
force from the growing number of retired voters, there is a sharp increase
over the next three decades in the retirement age that is stable against one
year changes. With our baseline parameter values, assuming that there is
no excess burden, if voters expect the chosen retirement age to remain in
place forever, then our model predicts majority support for a retirement age
of 59 in the year 2001. But if, under the same assumptions, voters revisit
the issue of retirement age in future years, the stable age under majority
voting will be 63 in 2010, 70 in 2020, and 79 in 2030.
Of course if actual retirement ages follow this trajectory, we would not
expect voters to continue to believe that the retirement age will remain
11constant. We have calculated expected payoﬀs for voters who believe that
retirement ages would be 59 in 2001, 63 in 2010, 70 in 2020 and 79 in 2030.
We ﬁnd that with these beliefs, support for the social security plan would
diminish among current workers so that about half of the population favors
a reduction in the amount of beneﬁts.
5.2 Constant Rate of Change of Retirement Age
Suppose that instead of voting on a once-and-for-all change in retirement
rates, voters select a constant rate of change for the retirement age. We
will suppose that pairwise voting takes place between alternatives that are
close. For example, voters are allowed to choose between an increase of one
year in the retirement age every ﬁve year versus a one year change every six
years. We ﬁnd that with the 2001 population and baseline assumptions and
a current retirement age of 66 years, there is stable majority support for an
increase in the retirement age of one year for every eight years in the future.
This majority-sustained rate does not change signiﬁcantly when voted on
by the projected populations of 2010, 2020, or 2030. Thus we would expect
political support for gradual increases in the retirement age from a current
age of 66 in 2001 to 67 in 2009, 68 in 2017 and 69 in 2025.
Suppose that voters vote on the size of retirement beneﬁts while being
aware that the retirement age will increase by one year at eight year intervals
into the future. With baseline assumptions and no excess burden, our model
suggests that the percentage of voters who would support an increase is
about 58%, as compared to 65% if the age of retirement is held constant.
125.3 The Dependency Ratio and Retirement Age
In the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign, both major candidates promised
not to increase taxes and not to reduce social security beneﬁts. They also
claimed that they would reduce the national debt. Not many thoughtful
people are likely to believe that these three promises are simultaneously
credible. But the fact that the candidates chose to make them, suggests
that there is a great deal of popular resistance to each of these options.
If the retirement age is held constant at 66, there will be about 0.19
retirees per worker from 2004 until 2010. This number, known as the de-
pendency ratio, will rise to about 0.24 by 2020 and to about 0.31 by 2030.
This means that if current social security beneﬁts are to be maintained on
a pay-as-you-go basis, then the average social security tax revenue collected
from each member of the working population would have to increase by
30% between 2010 and 2020 and by another 30% between 2020 and 2030.
If the distortionary costs from taxes rise more rapidly than tax revenue, the
required increase in tax rates would be larger than this.
Suppose that instead of increasing taxes or reducing beneﬁt levels for
the retired, the government chose to increase retirement ages just enough
to support the current level of beneﬁts at the current tax rates. This would
mean that the retirement age would have to be increased just enough to
maintain a constant dependency ratio. In 2001, when the retirement age
was 65, the dependency ratio was about 0.20. To maintain this ratio, the
retirement age would have to be increased to 66 in 2008, and 67 in 2014. In
the subsequent years, the retirement age would have to rise more rapidly,
with a one-year increase every three or four years until 2035, when the
retirement age would be 73. After 2035, the increases could be more gradual,
13eventually reaching 75 in 2088.
Suppose that alternatively, the government chose to use increased taxes
to allow the dependency ratio to increase from 0.20 to 0.25 and then main-
tain a constant dependency ratio by increasing the retirement age. Then
no changes in retirement age would be needed until 2018. After that, the
retirement age would have to increase by one year every three or four years,
reaching 71 in 2035.
6 Conclusions
If voters are assumed to vote according to their selﬁsh ﬁnancial interest and
if the age of retirement is ﬁxed, then despite the aging of the U.S. population
over the next thirty years, political support for maintaining at least current
levels of social security beneﬁts is likely to remain strong over this entire
period.
However, with the aging population, it is possible that in the next two
decades, majority support will be found for eroding the size of the social
security system through increases in the retirement age. If voters were able
to vote on changes in the retirement age which they believed (incorrectly)
to be once-and-for-all, they would support a retirement age of 70 by the
year 2020 and a retirement age close to 80 by 2030. Furthermore, if current
voters believe that such drastic increases in the retirement age are in store,
there would be majority support for once-and-for-all decreases in the size of
social security beneﬁts.
If voting on the retirement age is conﬁned to votes about a constant rate
of change in this age, the results are much more stable. The unique rate
of change that survives challenges from small accelerations or decelerations
14is an increase of about one year over the course of each eight years. This
rate of change would be supported not only by the current population, but
also by the projected populations for the years 2010, 2020, and 2030. If
voters are selﬁsh and believe that retirement age will increase at this rate,
then with our benchmark parameter values, about 58% of voters would favor
maintaining at least the current level of beneﬁts.
157 Appendix–Sensitivity Checks




Percentage of people voting yes (i.e. having positive 






% yes  comments 
 
5%  66  65.1%  Baseline case; 66 is retirement age for those 
born 1943-1954 
5%  65  66.2%  65 is retirement age for those born 1937 or 
earlier 
5%  67  65.1%  67 is retirement age for those born 1960 or later
7%  66  55.1%  Higher discount rate increases minimum age 
voting yes by ~5 yrs. (vs. baseline) 
3%  66  81.0%  Lower discount rate decreases minimum age 
voting yes by ~8 yrs. (vs. baseline) 
8.25%  66  50.6%  Men age 48+ & women age 47+ vote yes 
8.26%  66  49.6%  Men age 48 now vote no Î Given retirement 
age 66, 48 yr-old man is median voter 
5%  70  63.0%  Assuming discount rate is 5%, support remains 
high even with increased retirement age 
5%  75  58.6%  Even at age 75, support remains high 
7%  69  51.8%  Higher discount rate & retirement age; men age 
48+ & women age 46+ vote yes 
7%  70  49.6%  Men age 48 & women age 46 now vote no 
     
5%  66  67.3%  Immigration numbers are double the baseline 
case 
5%  66  65.1%  Immigration numbers are half the baseline case
     
5%  66  55.6%  100% of people age 18 and older vote 
     
5%  66  63.3%  Projected population for 2050 used; death 
tables and other appropriate adjustments made 
     
5%  66  65.1%  Birth rates are 20% lower than baseline 
5%  66  65.1%  Birth rates are 20% higher than baseline 
     
5%  66  63.0%  Uses 2000 death rates every year 
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